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DISASTER ASSISTANCE FOR U.S. FARMER~ 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT DEBATE AND TWO PROPOSALS 
The U.S. drought of 1988 has again focused attention on 
federal assistance to farm operators affected by natural disas-
ters. Disaster aid to farmers, which currently includes sub-
sidized crop insurance, emergency loans, and direct payments, has 
been a significant claimant on federal outlays since the mid-
1970s. Its cost has generated on-going national debate and 
continuous pol icy experimentation. Genealogy of this debate is 
explored in this article, and two proposals are advanced. 
The Farm Production/Financial Environment and Disaster Aid 
Farm disaster assistance was negligible prior to fiscal year 
(FY) 1975 (Table 1). In contrast, between FY 1975 and FY 1982, 
disaster loans and payments averaged 8.5% of annual net farm cash 
flow. Despite a sharp decline since FY 1982, disaster aid has 
still averaged 2.8 percent of annual net farm cash flow. 
The increase in disaster assistance during the mid-1970s was 
associated with several changes in the farm production/financial 
environment. One was increased variability in U.S. crop yields 
(Figure 1). The standard deviation about trend-line aggregate 
yield for major cereal crops equalled 4.6 percent of average 
aggregate yield between 1950 and 1969. Since then, this ratio has 
more than doubled to 11.0 percent. 
The four largest declines in yields between successive years, 
1974, 1980, 1983, and 1988, were associated with national 
droughts. Because droughts occurred before 1970, they are 
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probably not the only cause of increased variability. Others may 
be changes in production practices, in weather variables other 
than rainfall, and in the distribution of production. 
At about the same time that yield variability began to 
increase, another major change occurred in the farm production/ 
financial environment. In 1973, an income deficiency program was 
instituted for wheat, feed grains, and cotton. It was later 
extended to rice. Under this program, whenever market price is 
less than the established income target price for these crops, 
farmers are paid the deficiency between the target and market 
price, subject to a maximum payment equal to the target price 
minus loan rate. 
An income deficiency program substantially changes the 
financial effects of a widespread natural disaster. The reason is 
the short-term inelastic demand of major U.S. field crops. This 
economic characteristic means that a given percent decline in 
market production causes a greater percent increase in market 
price, resulting in more income for farm operators as a group. To 
illustrate, the 1988 drought reduced U.S. soybean production by 21 
percent compared with 1987 production. However, soybean prices 
were 48 percent· higher during September, October, and November of 
1988 than in 1987. Thus, despite a severe drought, harvest value 
of U.S. soybean production was 22 percent higher in 1988. 
In contrast, the aggregate impact of the 1988 drought on corn 
producers differs substantially from its aggregate impact on 
soybean producers, who receive no deficiency payment. Corn 
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production was 34 percent lower in 1988, while market price was 65 
percent higher during September, October, and November of 1988. 
The net result was a nine percent higher value of corn production 
in 1988 than 1987 based on harvest-time market prices. However, 
higher market prices mean lower deficiency payments. Based on the 
1988 loan rate of $1. 77 and target price of $2. 93, and assuming 
that deficiency payment is received on 5.37 billion bushels of 
corn (the average for 1986 and 1987 crops), the adjustment for 
lower deficiency payments means the harvest value of corn produc-
tion in 1988 was actually 30 percent less than in 1987. 
The drought's impact on individual farmers depends on both 
the aggregate market effects and the change in their production 
relative to the change in market production. For soybeans, a 
farmer would have the same harvest value of production in 1988 as 
in 1987 even though his/her production was 32 percent lower. In 
contrast, assumin~ the producer was enrolled in the 1987 and 1988 
corn programs (true for over 80 percent of corn base acres) , 
he/she would have to harvest a 27 percent larger crop in 1988 than 
in 1987 for the harvest values to be the same. 
As 1988 corn illustrates, a deficiency payment program 
negates the protection provided by short-term inelastic demand 
against the financial consequences of widespread natural disas-
ters. A target price means a constant revenue per unit of output. 
Thus, reduced output translates into lower income for producers as 
a group. This observation takes on added significance because 
droughts are by far the largest cause of yield loss (Figure 2). 
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FIGURE 2. AVERAGE PERCENTAGE OF FEDERAL 
CROP INDEMNITIES ATTRIBUTED TO SPECIFIC 
HAZARDS, 1948-86 
Drought--511 
Frost/Freeze--101 
SOURCE: Agricultural Statistics, 1987 (USDA) . 
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Insects--21 
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Droughts have a greater tendency than other natural disasters to 
affect market production and, thus, trigger the inelastic price 
response. 
Protection against the financial stress resulting from a 
natural disaster can be provided by insurance. Protection can 
also be provided by using financial assets and assets that can 
readily be converted into financial assets and/or nonfarm income 
to meet expenses not covered because of a natural disaster. These 
strategies are forms of self-insurance. 
Several sources of self-insurance for farm operators are 
presented in Table 2 as a percent of farm cash expenses: farm 
household financial assets, farm household financial assets plus 
farmer-held crop and livestock inventories, and farm household 
financial assets plus nonfarm income. Each ratio declined 
substantially between 1950 and 1981, before increasing during the 
1980s. The lower elch ratio, the mol'e likely money will need to 
be borrowed to cover expenses when a natural disaster occurs. 
A second aspect of self-insurance is that it declines 
appreciably as farm size increases (Figure 3). Thus, commercial 
farms appear to be most at risk if a natural disaster strikes. 
To summarize, the emergence of disaster assistance to farmers 
as a major federal expenditure during the mid-1970s coincided with 
an increase in yield variability, implementation of income 
deficiency payments, and an on-going decline in self-insurance. 
These coincidences are probably more than happenstance. 
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FIGURE 3. SELF INSURANCE BY FARM OPERATORS 
BY FARM SIZE, U.S., 1987. 
Coverage of Cash Expenses (I)* 
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Financial Assets ** 
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SOURCE: Economic Indicators of the Farm Sector: National 
Financial Summary, 1987. 
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Disaster Assistance Programs 
Emergency Loans 
Loans to farmers affected by natural disasters were first 
authorized by the Disaster Loan Act of 1949. Farmers Home 
Administration (FmHA) was designated as the lender. FmHA has 
since made about $23 billion in emergency disaster loans to 
farmers, most as direct loans. A second FmHA program was author-
ized by the Emergency Livestock Credit Act of 1974. This program 
guaranteed commercial loans to livestock and poultry producers who 
experienced financial stress because of a natural disaster. It 
was terminated in 1979 after $1.0 billion had been lent. 
FmHA disaster loans averaged $2 .4 billion annually from FY 
1975 through FY 1982 (Table 1). Since then, volume has declined, 
partly because eligibility was tightened. For example, the Food 
Secux:_~Act of 1985 limited eligibility to family-size farms who 
cannot obtain credit ~lsewhere. Also, beginning with 1987 crops, 
only farmers who buy crop insurance can receive disaster loans on 
those crops. Th~J?isaster Assist<!_nce Act of 1988 waived this 
requirement for 1988 crops; however, if the emergency loan will 
be used to finance planting of 1989 crops, 1989 crop insurance 
must be purchased. 
As of March 31, 1988, $8.7 billion in emergency disaster 
loans was outstanding. Of this value, 76 percent was held by 
delinquent borrowers. Furthermore, the value of these delinquent 
loans totalled 38 percent of all loans extended since the program 
began. The high delinquency rate suggests either that the loans 
10 
,• 
were extended to farmers already financially stressed and/or the 
burden of paying off the disaster loans precluded recovery from 
the initial financial impact of the disaster. 
Direct Disaster Assistance 
Direct disaster assistance began in 1961. Livestock produ-
cers were permitted to purchase government feed grain stocks at 
prices less than the farm program loan rate when a natural 
disaster reduced their production. Current livestock disaster 
assistance also includes cost-share assistance for a) feed 
purchased beyond the normal amount, b) transporting hay and forage 
purchased beyond the normal trade area, and c) transporting 
livestock to grazing areas. 
Federal outlays for 1 i vestock disaster assistance have 
historically been small, partly because aid is limited to produ-
ce~s who grow their own feed (Table 1). Table 1 does not include 
the value of haying and grazing set-aside and conservatio~ reserve 
acres, an important source of livestock disaster assistance in 
recent years. 
Direct disaster assistance was first authorized for crop 
producers by the Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973. 
Upland cotton, feed grain, and wheat producers who participated in 
the set-aside program could receive payments for prevented 
planting or low yield. This Disaster Payments Program, which was 
extended to rice producers in 1975, averaged almost $500 million 
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annually from FY 1975 through FY 1982 (Table 1). Because of its 
cost, it was terminated by the Federal Crop Insurance Act of 1980. 
Nevertheless, direct assistance fo_r crop producers continues 
to be authorized when widespread natural disasters occur. These 
ad hoc programs include The Disaster A~8-1~-~ance Act of 1988 and 
approximately $550 million of payment-in-kind certiffoates for 
farmers hurt by the 1986 drought in the southeast. The U.S. 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) currently estimates the former 
will provide over $3.0 billion in aid to crop farmers. 
Federal Crop Insurance 
Federal crop insurance was first authorized by the Federal 
Crop Insurance Act of 193~ to cover drought, hail, wind, flood, 
frost, disease, insect, and other unavoidable causes of crop 
losses. As with previous attempts by private companies to offer 
multi per i 1 insurance, .i '1rge losses were incurred. In response, 
Congress reduced crop insurance to an experimental program in 
1947. Limited expansion was subsequently undertaken. From 1948 
to 1979, acres insured increased from 8.9 to 21.4 million. 
The Federal Cro~surance Act of 1980 established crop 
insurance as the major federal disaster assistance program. 
Farmers who purchase crop insurance elect one of three prices and 
one of three yield levels. The prices very by crop and year. The 
yield levels are 50, 65, and 75 percent of the farmer's Federal 
Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC) yield. FCIC yield equals a 10-
year moving average, minus high and low, of the farm operator's 
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county average yields or actual verified yields if three years of 
verified yields exist. Indemnity collected (insurance payment) 
equals the elected price times the following: FCIC yield times 
elected yield percent minus actual yield. 
The premium paid by a farmer depends on the elected yield and 
price, his/her yield history, and the federal premium subsidy. 
The latter was authorized by the Federal Crop Insurance Act of 
1980 to encourage participation. It equals 30 percent of the 
premium for the 50 and 65 percent elected yields. For the 75 
percent elected yield, it equals the absolute dollar subsidy for 
the 65 percent elected yield. 
15-20 percent subsidy. 
This typically translates into a 
The subsidized premiums and development of an individualized 
insurance program based on a farmer's actual yields as opposed to 
county average yields, along with encouragement from lenders, have 
resulted in increased participation.· Acres enrolled totalled a 
preliminary 49.4 million in 1986, an increase of 131% since 1979. 
Participation was probably higher in 1987 and 1988 and should 
increase further in 1989. One reason is that The Disaster 
Assistance Act of 1988 requires, subject to certain exceptions, 
that farmers purchase 1989 federal crop insurance if they accept 
disaster payments and their 1988 yield was less than 35% of 
normal. A second reason is that farmers with 1988 crop insurance 
will collect more disaster assistance, including indemnities, than 
farmers without crop insurance. 
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Nevertheless, participation in federal crop insurance remains 
lower than desired, while indemnities have exceeded farmer-paid 
premiums by over $300 million per year between FY 1983 and FY 1987 
(Table 1). Congress has responded by establishing a commission to 
study the current program. Its report is due in 1989. 
Proposals 
While cost of The Disaster Assistance Act of 1988 has again 
placed disaster assistance for farmers on the national agenda, the 
political system has continually reaffirmed America's commitment 
to such assistance. Thus, history suggests disaster assistance to 
farmers will continue. Given this expectation, two proposals are 
delineated. One addresses federal crop insurance; the other, a 
self-insurance program. 
A Federal Crop Insurance Proposal 
' I 
A two-part proposal is advanced. One part concerns deter-
mination of elected prices while the other concerns determination 
of elected yields. 
The high elected prices, which are the most frequently chosen 
of the elected prices, have historically and continue to ap-
preciably exceed the national average cash cost of production, 
excluding cash land rent and principal payments (hereafter 
referred to as national average cash production costs). To 
illustrate, for the 1987 program, the high elected prices for 
corn, wheat, and soybeans were 119, 132, and 158 percent of 
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national average cash production costs. These costs were calcu-
lated using a 10 year moving average of national yields, minus the 
high and low, and the cash costs reported by USDA' s annual cost 
and returns survey. They include interest payments and taxes. 
Not only are the high elected prices substantially above the 
national average cash production costs, they also change as market 
prices change. For example, the high elected price for corn 
declined from $2.90 in 1984 to $2.00 in 1987, before being raised 
to $2.60 in 1989. Moreover, the high elected price for 1989 
soybeans will be determined by a formula based on market price. 
Thus, it appears that the current crop insurance program is keyed 
to protecting income as opposed to cash production costs. 
By providing insurance against income losses exceeding the 
national average cash production costs, the current insurance 
program encourages risky investment and managerial decisions. 
These moral hazards of insurance ir.crease its costs to the 
insurer. 
Evidence on the potential existence of moral hazard costs can 
be gleaned from data for the 1983 through 1985 programs. During 
this period, soybeans accounted for 37 percent of all net federal 
crop insurance indemnity payments, but only 18 percent of the 
value of maximum insured production. Wheat accounted for 24 
percent of total net indemnities and 18 percent of maximum insured 
production. In contrast, corn accounted for only one percent of 
total net indemnities but 27 percent of maximum insured produc-
tion. The reJative differences in payouts among the crops are 
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consistent with moral hazard: during these years, the ratio of 
high elected price to national average cash production costs was 
169 percent for soybeans, 149 percent for wheat, and 131 percent 
for corn. 
Not only do the current price elections appear to increase 
the moral hazard cost of federal crop insurance, they also inflate 
the price of land and other capital investments. The consistent 
excess of indemnities over farmer-paid premiums is capitalized 
into the value of these inputs, just as price and income supports 
are capitalized into input values. 
To avoid the moral hazards and associated higher costs of 
insuring against income losses above national average cash 
production costs, we propose that the high price elections be 
equal to the national average cash production costs. Applying 
this criteria to the period 1983 through 1985 would have substan-
tially reduced, and may have eliminated, the net federal cost of 
insuring corn, soybeans, and wheat. At the least, the ratio of 
high price election to national average cash production costs 
should be reduced for soybeans and wheat to the ratio for corn. 
This, in and of itself, would substantially reduce federal losses 
and moral hazard costs. 
The second part of the crop insurance proposal is tied to the 
short term inelastic demand for crops. As the 1988 drought 
illustrates, for a crop with no deficiency payment, an individual 
farmer suffers financial stress only if his/her yield (production) 
declines more than the decline in market yield (production). 
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Consequently, to more closely align crop insurance with the 
financial stress that results from a natural disaster, we propose 
that elected yields be stated relative to changes in market yield. 
To illustrate, for the 75 percent elected yield, indemnities 
are currently collected whenever an individual farmer's yield is 
at least 25 percent below his/her FCIC yield. Under this pro-
posal, indemnities would be collected only when the decline in a 
farmer's yield relative to FCIC yield is at least 25 percentage 
points more than the percent decline in national yield. For 
example, should national yield decline 10 percent, a farmer's 
yield must decline at least 35 percent below his/her FCIC yield 
before indemnities would be collected. If national yield does not 
decline, the proposal becomes the current program--an indemnity is 
received when yield is at least 25 percent below the FCIC yield. 
Under the current crop insurance program, more farmers 
collect higher net indemnities in years of widespread drought, 
despite higher prices. To illustrate, during the 1983 crop year, 
a year of nationwide drought, indemnities were collected on 49 
percent of insured soybean acres. Net indemnity per acre indem-
nified averaged $31. 43. In contrast, during the 1984 and 1985 
crop years, years with no nationwide drought, indemnities were 
collected on 38 percent of insured soybean acres; and net indem-
ni ty averaged $20 .15 per acre indemnified. Soybean pr ices 
averaged 44 percent higher during 1983 than during 1984 and 1985 
marketing years. 
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If the share of acres indemnified and per acre net indemnity 
in 1983 had been the same as in: 1984 and 1985, savings of $54 
million would have been achieved. This proposal would make the 
payment rates more similar in drought and non-drought years by 
targeting indemnities to those farmers who experience financial 
stress because of a drought. 
The allure of this proposal for elected yields is undercut 
for wheat, feed grains, cotton, and rice because higher prices are 
offset by lower deficiency payments. However, since yields must 
decline at least 25 percent before indemnities are collected, the 
current program provides only limited protection against the loss 
of deficiency payments. This dilemma suggests that a program to 
insure against the loss of deficiency payments may be worth 
investigation. 
The proposed changes for elected price and yield would reduce 
the net benefit and, thus, the attractiveness of crop insurance to 
those who currently purchase it. However, cost of crop insurance 
to the federal government would substantially decline. Subse-
quently, premiums may decline. This would encourage participation 
among current nonparticipants. Furthermore, a lower federal cost 
and reduced premiums would improve the political attractiveness of 
making crop insurance a requirement for price and income supports. 
A Disaster Assistance Self-Insurance Proposal 
An alternative to current disaster assistance programs is to 
encourage self-insurance. This could be accomplished by allowing 
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farm operators to place up to a pre-specified share of their cash 
farm expenses into an individualized disaster assistance account 
(IDAA). Taxes on income earned by an IDAA would be deferred until 
the year the income is removed. Funds could be removed whenever a 
natural disaster caused production to decline a pre-specified 
amount. Any amount left when the operator stops farming could be 
converted into a retirement account. 
Cost of IDAAs to the federal treasury would depend on the 
program's parameters. Assume that a farmer can accumulate a 
maximum of 40 percent of cash expenses in an IDAA and everyone 
participates. Because cash expenses currently total about $110 
billion (excludes principal payments), $44 billion would be 
contributed to IDAAs. Assume that only returns are tax deferred, 
and they accrue at an 8 percent annual rate. Thus, $3.5 billion 
would be tax deferred annually. Assume the earned returns would 
be taxed at the highest personal tax rate '"If 33 percent in the 
year earned but at zero when removed from the account. Amount of 
federal income tax lost wouJd, therefore, equal $1.16 billion 
annually. 
Counting the currently projected costs for 1988 disaster 
assistance, direct federal disaster assistance to farmers plus net 
federal crop insurance indemnities will average over $1 billion 
annually since FY 1982. Therefore, even with the conservative 
assumptions on the cost of an IDAA, a 40 percent IDAA would be no 
more expensive than current disaster programs. Cost of IDAAs 
could be further reduced by allowing Individual Retirement 
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Accounts and Keough retirement plans to be used for disaster 
assistance as well as retirement purposes. 
Assuming that the share of cash expenses which could be 
placed in an IDAA would be less than 100 percent, IDAAs would not 
cover situations where yields approach zero. To cover this 
possibilty, the current crop insurance program could be converted 
into a catastrophe program, with zero cost to the federal govern-
ment. For example, it could cover situations where yield is less 
than 25 percent of normal. An IDAA would also probably not cover 
a situation where it was triggered repeatedly within a short 
period of time. To cover this possibility, standby authority 
could exist for ad hoc disaster payments in this situation. 
IDAAs would compete for a farmer's limited capital. This 
capital could also be used to finance business expansions. 
However, an IDAA is not incompatible with long term business 
expansion. By improving the asset ledger on the balance sheet, 
accumulation of funds into an IDAA would set the stage for future 
growth and provide a less risky base for that growth. 
In summary, IDAAs could be designed to cost no more than 
current programs. Unlike current programs which exclude many 
producers, notably livestock producers who purchase all their 
feed, IDAAs would be available to all farm operators. Further-
more, they would reduce the need to borrow in an emergency, which 
the FmHA disaster loan program suggests is not a desirable 
strategy in many cases. and may increase savings, an emerging 
national concern. 
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Summary 
Increased yield variability, less self-insurance by farmers, 
and income support payments based on target prices have combined 
to increase national attention and resources devoted to disaster 
assistance for farmers since the mid-1970s. Counting the current-
ly-projected 1988 disaster aid, direct disaster assistance and net 
federal crop insurance indemnities have averaged over $1.0 billion 
dollars since FY 1982. Furthermore, emergency disaster loans have 
averaged about $500 million. 
A two-part proposal is advanced to reduce the cost of crop 
insurance to the federal treasury and potentially the premiums 
paid by farm operators. One part would base the elected prices on 
the national average cash cost of production, excluding cash land 
rent and principal payments. The other part would tie the elected 
yields to the decline in national yields. The former would reduce 
the moral hazard costs incurred by insuring i.rcome above cash 
costs, while the latter would target assistance to farm operators 
experiencing financial stress. 
An alternative to revising the federal crop insurance program 
is also advanced. It would encourage self-insurance among farm 
operators by establishing individual disaster assistance accounts. 
In conclusion, political debates during times of perceived 
crisis or extreme need may lead to larger government expenditures 
and/or different policjes than a debate held at a less precipitate 
time. In the spirit of this observation, the current discussion 
and proposals are offered. 
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